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GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE
NEGOTIATION AND TERMS OF
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT:
AN ADDRESS *
Archibald Cox t
While the Wagner bill was being debated in Congress, the Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor gave this ex-
position of its scope:
"When the employees have chosen their organization, when
they have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do
is to escort them to the door of the employer and say, 'Here they
are, the legal representatives of your employees.' What happens
behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek
to inquire into it." 1
For better or worse we have come a long way since 1947. The
National Labor Relations Board was never able to resist the temptation
to eavesdrop, or even to peek through the keyhole in order to see how
the discussions between employer and employees were progressing. In
recent years the government has slipped in to seek a seat at the bar-
gaining table. Yet we have not gone too far, I think, to ask ourselves
whether the governmental activities ought not to be confined to the
organizational stages of industrial relations. The inquiry is obviously
pertinent in any serious effort to revise our basic labor laws either by
statutory amendments or by reshaping the course of administrative
decisions.
Thus far the gradual but nonetheless marked increase in govern-
ment regulation of the negotiation and terms of collective bargaining
agreements has flowed in four currents, each fed by the others:
(1) the concept of bargaining "in good faith";
(2) the regulation of the procedures of collective bargaining;
* This is the text of an address given at a conference of the Labor Relations
Council of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania in April, 1953.
' Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School. Chairman, Wage Stabili-
zation Board, 1952. Associate Solicitor, United States Department of Labor, 1943-
45. Principal Mediation Officer, National Defense Mediation Board, 1941.
1. 79 CONG. Rc. 7660 (1935).
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(3) the definition of the scope of collective bargaining by listing
not only the subjects upon which an employer must bargain but also
the proposals which may not be interjected;
(4) the statutory restriction of the terms which management and
labor may include in their agreements.
It will be convenient to examine the problem separately under
each of the four heads.
I
It is a familiar rule that the statutory obligations imposed on man-
agement and union by Sections 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3) 2 are not satis-
fied merely by meeting and discussing proposals for a collective bar-
gaining agreement; the duty is to bargain "in good faith." "[I]t is
the obligation of the parties to participate actively in the deliberations
so as to indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement, and
a sincere effort must be made to reach a common ground." 3
I call attention to the doctrine for two reasons: The first is to
emphasize its indispensability. When Lloyd Garrison proposed making
it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively, he ex-
plained:
"It is essential to the bill; there is no purpose in forbidding dis-
crimination and providing for elections, if an employer can tell
the designated representatives 'Run along, I'm too busy.' The
end of the whole process is collective bargaining." 
4
The bargaining status of a union may be destroyed by going through
the motions of bargaining with the intention of avoiding agreement
just as effectively as by saying to the representative, "Run along, I'm
too busy." Even today the NLRB reports are filled with cases in
which a union won an election but lacked the economic power to use
the strike as a weapon for compelling the employer to grant it real
participation in governing the plant. So long as some employers go
through the forms of bargaining without the substance, so long as there
are unions which can be talked to death, protection of the rights of
self-organization and collective bargaining would be incomplete without
the imposition of a duty to bargain in good faith.
Some may object that good faith cannot be created by law-that
a clever negotiator can go through all the motions of bargaining with-
2. Statutory references throughout this paper are to the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
3. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943).
4. Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on S. 195, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 79 (1934).
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out really accepting the union yet without furnishing evidence of an
unfair labor practice. The objection is well taken, but there are several
answers. A good many companies would have done no more if listen-
ing politely would have satisfied their statutory obligations. The law
can influence men's attitudes up to a point by declaring a higher stand-
ard of conduct than the legal machinery can enforce. It was successful,
I think, in adding "good faith" to the bare forms of bargaining. Fur-
thermore, the employer who is seeking to destroy a union while he
goes through the forms of bargaining, usually is not quite clever
enough to mask his purpose. If he slips, the ensuing NLRB proceed-
ing may give the union a new lease on life because the Board will
order the employer to bargain with the union even though the union
has lost its majority status.
The second reason for dwelling on the duty to bargain in good
faith is to emphasize its dangers. The doctrine forms a bridge from
government protection of weak unions during their organizational
stages into government regulation of the processes of negotiation, of
the scope of the contract and of the terms on which a bargain can be
struck. The statute is said to require "an open mind and a sincere
desire to reach an agreement " . 6 "[A] sincere effort must be
made to reach a common ground." 7 Read literally, these expressions
are inconsistent with complete freedom to hold out for whatever terms
one wishes, for the chance of finding common ground is measurably
increased by willingness to compromise. Where then is the balance
to be struck between the positions an employer--or a union-may
take in the exercise of the freedom to contract only on such terms as it
deems acceptable and the positions which it must surrender out of "an
open mind and sincere desire to reach an agreement"? Must the em-
ployer offer proposals that the government deems "reasonable" and
abandon "unreasonable" positions? The risk of sliding into some such
doctrine is increased by the problem of proof. How can the Board
determine whether an employer is seeking to reach an agreement or to
destroy the union? Suppose the employer makes proposals which no
self-respecting union would accept and steadfastly holds his ground
through repeated conferences. Shall we say that he is a bit odd? A
tough negotiator? Or shall we say that a man who takes such a posi-
tion must be trying to break the union? Good faith is subjective; in
the absence of admissions, anti-union discrimination or threats to close
5. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
6. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (Ist Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
7. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943).
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the plant, our only way of delving into the state of the employer's
mind is to look at the way he conducts himself in the negotiations and
measure it against what we suppose would be done by an ordinary man
acting in good faith. The natural tendency is to suppose that an
ordinary man acting in good faith would make reasonable proposals
and therefore to conclude that a company which fails to make reason-
able proposals is violating its statutory duty. Russell Smith argued
some years ago that:
"As a practical matter, a 'duty to bargain' must, in order to be
capable of enforcement, be given a special definition. Two possi-
bilities are: (1) that it be deemed simply to require union recog-
nition and negotiation; (2) that it be deemed to require that plus
the making of objectively reasonable proposals." 8
We have turned away from the former course. Does this mean we
must follow the latter?
Thus far the Board has successfully steered between Scylla and
Charybdis. The logical difficulty can be minimized by recognizing
that what good faith requires is a willingness to contract on some
terms-in other words, the absence of a desire to avoid entering into
a collective bargaining agreement. This formula explains most of the
decisions. With respect to the others, perhaps it is enough to say that
our legal system offers a good many examples of legal duties which
we can express only by stating an antinomy made up of postulates as
self-contradictory as the freedom to reject any proposals you deem
objectionable regardless of the reason and the duty to make a sincere
effort to reach common ground. The danger lies in stressing one
branch of the antinomy at the expense of its opposite. Last year an
NLRB Associate General Counsel told the Supreme Court that the
Board would find bad faith if it judged an employer to be unreason-
able.' More recently the Board found that a labor union had failed
to bargain in good faith because it made a proposal during the course
of negotiations which, while inherently reasonable, was calculated to
make the negotiations more difficult."°
II
The difficulty of reconciling the duty to bargain in good faith
with freedom to insist on one's own terms as the price of agreement
8. Smith, Evolition of the "Duty to Bargain" Covcept in American Law, 39
MicH. L. Rv. 1065, 1108 (1941).
9. Transcript of Oral Argument, NLRB v. American National Ins. Co., 20
U.S.L. WEns 3238 (U.S. March 11, 1952).
10. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B.
972 (1949), enforcement granted sub nor., Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.
1952).
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has its counterpart in regulation of collective bargaining procedures.
There is the same clear case for intervening to strike down outrageous
tactics and the same temptation to restrict the freedom of the parties
and the flexibility of collective bargaining as a method of governing
life in an industrial plant.
As a starting point consider the doctrine that Section 8(a) (5)
imposes on employers the duty of furnishing a union with information
concerning merit increases, incentive systems and other data likely to
be helpful during the course of negotiations. The earliest cases arose
upon evidence showing that the employer had pursued tactics calculated
to break the union, stalled the negotiations, pleaded inability to pay a
wage increase, and then refused to open his profit and loss account to
either the union or a certified public accountant. The Board concluded
that under such circumstances the withholding of data to support the
plea of poverty was evidence of.bad faith.1 The idea of bad faith
gradually dropped into the background. More and more emphasis was
placed on the unions' need for information. In the end the initially
narrow rulings were converted into the doctrine that an employer
violates Section 8(a) (5) by refusing to furnish the union with rele-
vant information.'
The doctrine itself is sound. The plea that the information is
confidential usually expresses an emotional desire to keep it secret
rather than a rational conclusion supported by legitimate interests.
But implications are troublesome. Saying that there is a duty to fur-
nish information because withholding it would hamper the negotiations
recalls the ruling that a union committed an unfair labor practice by
interjecting a demand which made negotiations more difficult."3 I
wonder whether the one did not lead to the other.
Even in the field of procedure one may wonder where the decisions
lead. Several years ago the tripartite Slichter Commission discussed
ways of improving the techniques of collective bargaining. 4 One
suggestion was that both parties should forego public statements dur-
ing the course of negotiations. A few unions bitterly criticized the
suggestion on the ground that whipping up community sentiment is
11. Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 837 (1936); Sherwin-Williams Co.,
34 N.L.R.B. 651 (1941), enforcement granted, 130 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1942).
12. Vanette Hosiery Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1948), enforcement granted, 179
F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1950); B.F. Goodrich Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1151 (1950); Southern
Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950); NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187
F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951).
13. See note 9 mtpra.
14. Report to the Governor of Massachusetts on Labor-Management Relations,
Honse No. 1875, reprinted in 1 INDUSTRIAL AND LAso RELATIO NS REvizw 110
(1947).
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necessary to lay the groundwork for an effective threat to strike.
Should the rule requiring an employer to furnish information extend
as far as its reason and proscribe public statements where silence would
also facilitate negotiations? The question is not entirely fanciful. A
few years ago a United States District Court held that General Electric
Co. had failed to bargain in good faith chiefly because it asked for an
adjournment of the negotiations and then released a statement of its
position to the public before giving it to the union., If the making
of public statements may be an unfair labor practice when it threatens
to impede negotiations, may not the same ruling be extended to all
other items on the Slichter Commission list?
.There are fallacies in the argument that each step down the road
of intervention into the processes of collective bargaining must be fol-
lowed by its logical successor. It leads all too easily to seeing ghosts
under the bed. But before the government takes additional steps it
would be equally foolish not to look to the implications and decide
whether we are prepared to accept them or how are we to avoid them
if we will. This is a terrain where a few short steps may start us
running downhill.
The danger is scarcely less in the case of statutory regulation.
Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act is the first instance of Congres-
sional regulation of collective bargaining procedures. Thus far the
regulation consists only of prescribing a series of notice periods which
must elapse before either management or union may terminate or
modify a collective bargaining agreement and resort to economic
weapons. The measure is harmless enough-perhaps it has done good
-but even this slight degree of regulation may have an unexpected
backlash. One reading of Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB 10 is that an
agreement to continue production under the terms of the old contract
pending negotiation of a new one started the 60-day period running a
second time. Such a rule obviously tends to discourage interim agree-
ments-a consequence that the draftsmen of the statute can scarcely
have foreseen. May not such repercussions be inevitable whenever
government moves into this delicate field?
III
For a number of years after the enactment of the Wagner Act
there was little occasion for public labor policy to be concerned with
15. General Electric Co. v. Gojack, 68 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
16. 174 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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the subject matter of collective bargaining." Many of the older craft
unions strong enough to present broader demands were content to
bargain about such traditional subjects as wages, hours of work,
seniority, and union status. Other unions were busy organizing new
workers and securing collective agreements upon familiar matters of
employee concern. Later the scope of union demands expanded until
they came into conflict with management's reluctance to surrender its
"prerogatives," and controversies resulted over the proper functions
of management and union not only over pensions and merit increases
but also over shift schedules, subcontracting and technological change.
Usually the issues were settled by negotiations resulting in an endless
variety of arrangements-with or without resort to economic sanctions.
The scope of collective bargaining was defined by collective bargaining
with all the flexibility and private responsibility of that institution.
But in recent years there has been an increasing tendency to carry the
issue to the NLRB and the courts.
There is little in the basic statutory provisions to suggest that the
NLRB and ultimately the courts should define the scope of collective
bargaining. Section 8(5) provided that it should be an unfair labor
practice for an employer: "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees subject to the provisions of Section
9 (a)." Section 9(a) added only that the representatives designated
by a majority of the employees, "shall be the exclusive representatives
. for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."
An employer who insists on negotiating with individual employees or
who takes unilateral action without consulting the union is denying
the union full recognition." An employer who takes the position that
"the collective bargaining relationship [consists] of presenting griev-
ances by the [employees'] representatives, fair consideration by the
Management, and issuance by the Management of necessary instruc-
tions covering the decisions reached," cannot be said to have accepted
the principle of collective bargaining."9 Possibly an employer who
refuses to discuss such a subject as wages, or hours of work, or senior-
ity, or the establishment of a grievance procedure could be said to be
committing an unfair labor practice, for tradition teaches us that every
union which has received true recognition has bargained about those
17. A considerable part of Section III of this paper is adapted-with some direct
quotation-from Cox and Dunlop, Regulatioai of Collective Bargaining by thw NLRB,
63 HAnv. L. Rv. 389 (1950).
18. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) ; Medo Photo Supply Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d
180, 186 (4th Cir. 1942).
19. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943).
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subjects. But if the employer recognizes the union and engages in col-
lective bargaining, ought he to be held to violate Section 8(a) (5) by
refusing to discuss such questions as job content, shift schedules, or
subcontracting-subjects which have long been handled in different
ways in different industries?
Although the Supreme Court has passed no opinion on the ques-
tion, the current of Board and court decisions is flowing strongly in
the direction of government regulation. The Board has declared that
Section 9 (a) covers, in addition to wages and hours, such subjects as
holiday and vacation pay, 0 discharges,"' pensions, 2 bonuses,2 profit
sharing,24 work loads and work standards,' insurance benefits," the
closed or union shop,2 7 subcontracting,28 shop rules,2 9 work schedules,"
rest periods " and merit increases.2 Most of these statements can be
put aside as unnecessary dicta but a number involve square determina-
tions that the Board has the power and duty to decide which subjects
an employer must discuss during contract negotiations and which, if
any, he may exclude. Approval of this postulate is implicit in several
court of appeals decisions.'
20. Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), enforcemen granted, 119 F.2d
131 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Athens Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 605, 606-7 (1946).
21. NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1941).
22. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, enforcemnent granted, 170 F.2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
23. Union Mfg. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 322 (1948).
24. Ibid.
25. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 42, 54-5 (1940).
26. W. W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enforcement granted, 174
F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949); General Motors Corp., 81 N.IR.B. 779 (1949).
27. NLRB v. Winona Textile Mills, Inc., 160 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1947);
Andrew Jergens Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 363 (1948); Alexander Milburn Co., 62 N.L.R.B.
482 (1945).
28. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforcement denied
on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947); cf. Emerson Electric Mfg. Co.,
13 N.L.R.B. 448 (1939).
29. Timken Roller Bearing Co., smpra note 28.
30. Inter-City Advertising Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 1377, 1384 (1945), enforcement de-
nied on, other grounds, 154 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1946) ; Wilson & Co., 19 N.L.R.B.
990, 999, enforcement granted, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940) ; Woodside Cotton Mills
Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 42, 54-5 (1940).
31. National Grinding Wheel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 905 (1948).
32. Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942), enforcing 39
N.L.R.B. 1286 (1942); NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948), enforcing 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946); cf. National
Grinding Wheel Co., note 31 supra. In 5 NLRB ANrN. REP. 43 (1940), the Board
stated that it had also held that "a union demand upon an employer to discharge
a supervisor was a demand with respect to conditions of employment. . . ." The
report implied that the ruling involved § 8(a) (5), citing Aladin Industries, Inc., 22
N.L.R.B. 1195, 1216 (1940). Examination of the case makes it plain that the Board
held only that employees whcqstruck to enforce such a demand did not lose their
position as employees under § 2(9).
33. E.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 960 (1949).
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In 1947 Congress endorsed the same position. Section 8(d) de-
fines the duty to bargain collectively as embracing the obligation of
employer and union to "confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." Although this
section was not intended to create new obligations, the ease with which
the recital was put into the Act is so indicative of the climate of opinion
that it must be regarded as settled, in the absence of new legislation,
that both union and employer must bargain collectively, upon request of
the other, about each and every subject the NLRB finds to be embraced
by Section 9(a).
Before attempting to appraise the impact of this degree of gov-
ernment regulation of the subject matter of collective bargaining, atten-
tion should be called to three decisions which seriously intimate that
the National Labor Relations Board and the courts may next assert
the power to exclude certain proposals from collective bargaining. In
Dalton Telephone Company 4 the company and union thrashed out all
the provisions of a collective agreement except the company's demand
that the union subject itself to suits for breach of contract by regis-
tering with the Secretary of State in a manner provided by Georgia
law. The NLRB held that the company violated Section 8(a) (5)
by insistence on this proposal. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the ruling, saying:
"There are certain things about which the parties may bargain
or negotiate, but which cannot be insisted upon as a condition
precedent to the making of a contract. The present case presents
such a situation. Respondent, by insisting that the union become
an entity amenable to suit in the state courts, left the sphere of
'terms and conditions of employment,' and conditioned his wil-
lingness to sign the agreement on a matter outside the area of
compulsory bargaining." *
In the second case a trucking concern called a conference for the
purpose of negotiating a settlement of a prolonged strike. The union
demanded a $5,000 compliance bond before signing a contract on the
ground that the employer had repeatedly violated previous agreements.
The Board concluded "that the Union's insistence upon a bond, in the
circumstances of this case, was not wholly unreasonable and that it
was not . . . designed to frustrate the settlement of the strike." Never-
theless the Board ruled:
"... [T]he Union's good faith in advancing this proposal is not
decisive of the issue. It is the tendencynof such proposals to 'delay
34. 82 N.L.R.B. 1001 (1949).
35. NLRB v. Dalton Telephone Co., 187 F.2d 811, 812 (5th Cir. 1951).
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or impede or otherwise circumscribe the bargaining process,' which
renders them improper. We conclude that by demanding this
bond as a condition of settlement of the strike, the Union violated
Section 8(b) (3) of the Act." "O
It is difficult to know what development these decisions presage.
The generalization underlying the Dalton Telephone ruling would seem
to be that an employer violates Section 8(a) (5) whenever he con-
ditions his willingness to accede to the contract proposed by a union
upon the union's making some concession on a subject outside the
scope of compulsory bargaining. If so a union violates Section 8 (b) (3)
whenever it conditions its willingness to accede to a proposed agree-
ment upon the employer's making a concession on a subject outside the
scope of collective bargaining as defined by the Board. The result of
the Conway's Express " case confirms this inference, although the lan-
guage of the opinion makes the different but still more troublesome
assertion that the union's position was unfair because it had a tendency
to "delay or impede" the bargaining process.
The import of the question raised may be illustrated by specific
examples. Suppose that the United Mine Workers were to inform
the Bituminous Coal Operators Association that it would accept the
terms of a proposed collective bargaining agreement if the Operators
would agree to open the mines only three days a week. Would the
United Mine Workers be technically guilty of an unfair labor practice
because it had conditioned its willingness to enter into a collective
agreement upon the employer's agreeing to curtail the volume of pro-
duction? Would the case turn on whether volume of production is or
is not a compulsory subject of collective bargaining? To take another
case, suppose that the United Automobile Workers were actually to
espouse the view its officers have sometimes expounded and condition
its willingness to execute an otherwise satisfactory contract upon an
automobile company's promise not to raise the price of cars? Are the
prices of the employers' product embraced within the phrase "rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"?
If not, would the UAW's insistence upon its proposal be an unfair
labor practice?
There is a strong temptation to push the Dalton Telephone and
Conway's Express cases aside as sports, attributable to the early abuse
of performance bonds. But before that explanation is too readily ac-
36. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B.
972, 979 (1949), enforcement granted sub nom. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d
Cir. 1952).
37. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Conway's Express), mtpra note 10.
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cepted, note should be made of one judicial decision. Early in 1950
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board was per-
suaded to intervene in the coal dispute which had embarrassed the
government for many months. He sought an injunction under Section
10(j) upon the ground, among others, that the United Mine Workers
had failed to bargain collectively by insisting upon the inclusion of the
so-called able and willing and memorial period clauses in the national
agreement. ' The court sustained this contention partly on the ground
that such a clause was inconsistent with Section 8(d) and partly on
the ground that the purpose of the provisions was "to control produc-
tion and ultimately, through such control, at least indirectly, to fix
prices." "8
The NLRB decisions discussed above have gone a long way
towards committing the Board to regulating the scope of collective
bargaining by including some subjects and excluding others. How
should one appraise the development? Is it good, bad, or indifferent?
And if it is bad, what should be done to check the trend? Although
the arguments are not all on one side, the serious objections to govern-
ment regulation of the subject matter of bargaining seem weightier
than the advantages.
In the first place one of the great sources of strength in collective
bargaining is its flexibility and adaptability to the needs of particular
situations. In some industries it may be desirable or even necessary
for employee representatives to participate in the award of merit in-
creases, the scheduling of shift operations, and decisions upon whether
to subcontract work. In other industries the balance of convenience
may lie on the side of exclusively managerial decisions. The proposi-
tion is demonstrated by the wide variety of ways in which industry
and labor have agreed to handle such matters. 9 If it may be said that
there is nothing in the NLRB rulings which precludes each industry
from working out its own solution to these problems,40 the answer is
that although this is theoretically true, the practical effect of decisions
requiring an employer to bargain this or that subject creates heavy
pressure for uniform arrangements according to the prescription of the
Board. Surely no one denies the impact of the Inland Steel 4' decision
38. Penello v. United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935, 940 (D.D.C. 1950).
39. Materials illustrating this proposition may be found in Cox and Dunlop,
Regudation, of Collective Bargaining by the NLRB, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389, 401-
418 (1950).
40. General Controls Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1341, 1342 (1950); Findling and Colby,
Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the NLRB-Another View, 51 Coi. L. Rnv.
170, 171-2 (1951).
41. See note 22 =pra.
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on the spread of pension plans. If the case had gone the other way, it
would have thrown the weight of government against their develop-
ment.
Second, collective bargaining is a changing, dynamic institution.
In one area its scope may be expanded. In another, the parties' rela-
tionship may not have matured to the point where it is wise to expand
joint discussions beyond such conventional subjects as wages, hours,
seniority and a grievance procedure. Moreover, those who fear that
management might be able to restrict the scope of bargaining today in
dealing with weak unions should remember that there is another side
to the coin-that the power to define the scope of collective bargaining
by inclusion implies the excluding of other subjects, as the decisions
cited above portend. If the pension issue had arisen in 1936, would
the NLRB, not to mention the courts, have decided that pensions were
within the phrase "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment"? Should the issue arise today, would the
courts surely hold that the quoted phrase includes technological
changes, job content, subcontracting, prices or the level of production?
Third, the government's competence to act wisely upon such ques-
tions is doubtful. An administrative agency is far removed from the
subtle practicalities which vary from industry to industry and plant to
plant. The NLRB is staffed chiefly by lawyers, most of whom lack
practical experience. Staff advice andotherefore Board decisions are
all too often based upon conceptualism or abstract generalities; prece-
dents are extended by the process of logical deduction without much
appreciation of the practical significance of apparently small changes
in the facts. The fault lies not so much in the agencies as in lifting
the problems out of the hands of those who must live with the solution.
The chief arguments against this conclusion are two. One is that
it negates the basic policy of the Act-the philosophy that industrial
unrest is minimized by discussing any issue which the employees wish
to raise. Perhaps so; but it is not the policy of the Act nor would it
be a wise policy to pursue industrial peace at the expense of every other
social or economic ideal. The second argument is that employers or
unions having disproportionate strength would be able to remove from
the scope of bargaining issues which everyone will agree ought to be
negotiated. Some companies in the South have narrowed the area of
bargaining by asserting that subjects which most of us would regard
as negotiable are management prerogatives. The ITU might remove
from joint conferences such important matters as the proportion of
apprentices to journeymen. To some extent the government must
intervene in favor of weak unions-and today, perhaps, in favor of
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weak employers. The Wagner Act was an avowed attempt to protect
the weak against the strong. Some aspects of the Taft-Hartley Act
were intended to weight the scales in favor of employers in cases where
a union could exert disproportionate economic power. It is one thing,
however, to protect employees in forming unions and to support weak
unions in seeking to secure bona fide recognition. It is quite another
for the government to enlarge the scope of the bargaining merely
because a union lacks the economic power to compel the employer to
negotiate on all the subjects it desires.
If it is correct to say that the NLRB and courts have been moving
too far in the direction of government regulation of collective bargain-
ing the question becomes, "How shall we check the trend?" Three
answers suggest themselves.
The solution proposed by the Chamber of Commerce, is for the
Congress to define management functions which need not be the sub-
ject of collective bargaining. 2  The cure would be worse than the
disease. The objections advanced against Board and court decisions
apply with greater force to statutory regulation. Statutory regulation
would have the additional defects which will be mentioned below in
the discussion of Congressional regulation of the terms of collective
agreements.
An alternative legislative solution would be enactment of one of
the bills offered both at the previous and current sessions of Congress
to forbid the Board to define the scope of collective bargaining.' This
would leave the scope of bargaining to the forces of persuasion backed
by economic power. The bills are not subject to criticism on the
ground that they would compel uniformity, freeze present practices or
substitute government determination for personal, private responsibility.
We should be better off if this provision had been in the law from the
beginning; but the advantages of writing it into the law today may be
somewhat offset by the risk that once the Congress intervenes-even
to the point of telling the NLRB to get out-the step may create pres-
sures for further legislation.
Perhaps the answer depends on the chance that the Board will
reevaluate its policy-or be compelled to make a reappraisal by the
court. In NLRB v. American National Insurance Co." the Supreme
Court of the United States held that it was not a violation of Section
8(a) (5) to bargain in good faith for a clause allocating wide functions
42. See summary of testimony before the House Committee on Labor reported
in 31 LAn. REx. REP. 346 (1953).
43. See, e.g., S. 369, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 2510, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953).
44. 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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to management during the term of a collective agreement. By over-
turning the NLRB doctrine that management could not lawfully insist
upon unilateral control of any term or condition of employment, this
decision cut off the worse features of government intervention. Simi-
larly, it is not too late to hope for reexamination of the statement that
a party commits an unfair labor practice by raising demands which
may impede the bargaining process or by making agreement upon some
matter outside of the scope of compulsory bargaining a precondition
to agreement upon other issues.
There remains the practice of defining those matters which either
party must discuss at the request of the other. It is too late now for
the NLRB itself to change this doctrine. Were it to change, the courts
might well adhere to the previous decisions. However, some of the
unwholesome effects of government prescription would be eliminated
if the Board were to decide that each party must bargain on any sub-
ject that the other wishes to raise. If this solution is impractical or
unsound, then Congress should deprive the Board of power to define
the scope of bargaining by including some subjects and excluding
others.
IV
In one sense the legislative branch of the government has gone
farther than the executive or judicial branches in regulating the sub-
stance of collective bargaining. Although the Sherman Act by judicial
construction, the Clayton Act of 1914, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
the Wagner Act were all instances of government intervention pro-
foundly affecting the balance of power between employers and em-
ployees, the Taft-Hartley Law marks the first occasion on which the
Congress regulated the terms that might be included in collective
agreements for the purpose of settling in favor of one side or the other
specific issues which had theretofore been left to discussion and the
interplay of economic forces.
One illustration is Section 302, which prescribes the conditions
on which employers and labor unions may establish trust funds for the
benefit of employees and their families. After the war the spreading
demand for pension plans and various forms of insurance met with
corresponding resistance in some management circles. The controversy
was especially keen in the case of the United Mine Workers. In 1946
federal legislation was proposed by southern Congressmen in the in-
terest, if not at the request, of southern coal operators who were unable
to carry their point in the bargaining process. Apparently this was
REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
the source of Section 302, although its actual effect is to allow the pay-
ments on three conditions: First, the trust funds must be held only for
the purposes specified in the act. Second, employers and employees
must be jointly represented in the administration of the fund, with an
impartial person to decide disputes. Third, the funds for providing
pensions and annuities must be segregated.
Since health, welfare and pension funds represent large accumula-
tions of money held for the benefit of employees by union officials,
there could be little question of the wisdom of government supervision
similar to State regulation of mutual savings banks and mutual insur-
ance companies. No one should complain of public scrutiny who holds
other people's money. But when the regulation is cast in terms of
what a collective agreement may provide instead of supervising the
administration of any fund it may establish, when the law sets up the
employer as the watch dog for the protection of beneficiaries, it becomes
a legislative attempt to resolve collective bargaining issues rather than
normal public supervision of fiduciaries. The bill introduced by Senator
Taft to amend Section 302 would interject the government still farther
by prohibiting the payment of moneys into a fund until its provisions
had been reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Labor.5
Similar doubts arise concerning the Taft-Hartley prohibition of
the closed shop and its limitation reducing the union shop to a device
for securing financial support from all the employees in a bargaining
unit. The 1947 hearings produced overwhelming evidence of the need
for some legislation upon the subject. Union security agreements put
enormous power in the hands of officials chosen by a majority of the
employees that may be used to oppress individuals and minorities
within the group. A few unions used this power to establish job
monopolies, to suppress fair competition or to punish individuals with
divergent political views. Although the abuses are rare and most
unions can be relied upon to correct them, it is inconsistent with our
democratic ideals to deny minorities protection on the ground that the
majority will not abuse its power very often. But the union security
question is not simply a problem of minority rights. It has been fought
out over the conference table and on the picket line because the union
desired security against internal disintegration and interunion rating,
while the employer wished to preserve his relative bargaining power
by denying this added strength to the employees' representative. More-
over, not every company opposes closed or union shop agreements.
Several weeks ago I was present at a meeting of personnel men who
45. See S. 658, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. -(1953).
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were roundly scolding the government for not outlawing all forms of
union security. My rather mild objection served to arouse only
stronger feelings until one man in the back of the room arose and said
this:
"You don't really understand the problem. I was Personnel Man-
ager for a big western contractor. Any device by which a union
delivers the number of workers you want with the skills you
require 500 miles out in the sage brush where there just wasn't
anybody before you got there, all without cost to you, is a damned
good arrangement."
It is not my purpose to argue that union security is good or bad.
It is to ask whether it is really desirable to have the issue between
employers and employees resolved by legislation instead of bargaining.
The Massachusetts Slichter Law and not a few court decisions show
how the necessary protection of minorities can be achieved without
outlawing the closed shop or making non-payment of dues the only
permissible ground of discharge under a union shop agreement.
46
Personally, I think the question should be answered in the nega-
tive. The uniformity inherent in any statutory rule is not suited to
an economy made up of an infinite variety of businesses with all sorts
of needs and customs. In some industries it may be wise for em-
ployers to join in the administration of welfare funds. In others it is
a futile burden. Indeed Senator Taft's amendments to Section 302
have the merit of relieving employers from this necessity, although
I cannot understand why joint or single administration should depend
exclusively on the employer's decision. The closed shop has been
abused in some industries; it serves no useful purpose in others; but
I cannot help thinking of my friend who wanted to hire through the
union because it relieved his construction company of the need for
recruiting labor. What is the objection to such an arrangement pro-
vided that there are safeguards which prevent it from being an instru-
ment of oppression?
Another important aspect of the problem, perhaps, is embraced
in the old aphorism, "What the government gives, the government can
take away." When unions went to a sympathetic NLRB to expand
the scope of collective bargaining, they themselves created the risk
that industrialists would go to a sympathetic Congress to curtail it.
When industrialists lift the problem of union security from the bar-
46. The Massachusetts legislation and cases in other states are discussed in
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Managewent Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L.
REv. 274, 291-299 (1948).
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gaining table into the Capitol, do they not create the risk that the Con-
gress may some day resolve the issue, but in the opposite manner?
In New Zealand and Saskatchewan a certified or registered union is
entitled to maintenance of membership or compulsory membership by
statute.
Last-and perhaps too philosophical-we must ask ourselves
whether it is wise to make such issues national problems instead of
letting them remain small questions to be settled variously, in different
ways, in different places, on different occasions.
